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Abstract 
Recent behavioral observations suggest an influence of prior expectancies on attention to 
neutral targets, while the detection of threatening targets remains comparably immune to these 
expectancies. The origin of this asymmetry, however, remains unclear. Here, therefore, we 
investigated its neural basis by using fMRI. Specifically, we tested whether, in accordance 
with the idea of a resetting attentional system during phylogenetic threat detection, neural 
responses for threatening compared with neutral targets would remain largely unaffected by 
prior expectancies. Alternatively, neural responses could reflect equally strong expectancy 
influences on both types of targets, with the respective patterns differing, thereby producing 
the asymmetric effect observed in behavior. Predictive cues in our study evoked specific 
behavioral and neural expectancy states and effectively modulated response latencies to detect 
neutral (bird) targets in a 3 × 3 visual search matrix: When threat-related (spider) rather than 
neutral targets were expected, bird detection was considerably slowed, and the neural 
response to expected birds differed from that to unexpected birds. Conversely, and in line 
with the hypothesis of a resetting attentional system for phylogenetic threat, expectancy cues 
had no impact on reaction times or neural responses for spider targets – either in spider 
phobics or in non-spider-fearful controls. Our data support the idea of bottom-up 
enhancement of threat-related information through processing pathways unaffected by top-
down modulatory influences such as expectancy. These pathways may subserve rapid and 
comparably automatic responding to threat stimuli by safeguarding independence from more 
controlled and explicit expectancies, consequently promoting adaptive behavior and survival. 
 
Keywords: expectancy bias, attention bias, combined bias hypothesis, fear, phobia, 
biological preparedness, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)  
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Expectancies Influence Attention to Neutral But Not Necessarily to Threatening Stimuli:  
An fMRI Study 
 
Fear is pain arising from the anticipation of evil.  - Aristotle 
 
As noted by Aristotle, anticipation (i.e., expectancy) of threat is a powerful 
determinant of fear. Such a view receives support by the observation of so-called expectancy 
biases that are considered to be a hallmark of anxiety disorders (e.g., animal phobia, social 
phobia, and flight phobia; Aue & Hoeppli, 2012; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Mühlberger, 
Wiedemann, Hermann, & Pauli, 2006; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, den Breejen, & Makkelie, 
2007). For example, even when they receive background information about the objective 
likelihood of encountering different animals, spider phobics (but not non-spider-fearful 
controls) systematically overestimate the likelihood of encountering spiders rather than snakes 
or birds (Aue & Hoeppli, 2012; Aue, Hoeppli, Piguet, Hofstetter, Rieger, & Vuilleumier, 
2015). Recently, these biased expectancies in spider phobics have been shown to involve 
deactivations in key integration and regulation centers in the brain, such as the precuneus and 
the lateral prefrontal cortex; the more strongly these areas are deactivated, the stronger the 
displayed bias is (Aue et al., 2015). 
While these findings are compelling, the exact functions of anticipation for threat-
related behavior preparation remain to be determined. It seems plausible to assume that 
expectancy of threat enhances visual attention, thus permitting successful detection of the 
threat source in the environment. Such a process could hence increase the chance of 
adaptively responding to a threatening situation (cf. Mohanty & Sussman, 2013). In line with 
the hypothesis of such an association of threat-related expectancies and attention 
enhancement, highly fearful and phobic individuals are characterized by both expectancy 
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biases (e.g., exaggerated expectancies of encountering a feared threat) and deviated 
attentional processes (see Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015, for a detailed overview). Apart from 
those for expectancy biases, neural substrates have also been identified for attention biases: 
The amygdala is proposed to be the key structure implicated in early automatic vigilance for 
threat, whereas the prefrontal cortex is thought to mediate more controlled biased attentional 
responding, namely, difficulty in disengaging attention from threat once it has been oriented 
to and attentional avoidance of threat (see Cisler & Koster, 2010, for a division of attention 
biases into three distinct categories). 
A paradigm that has often been used to study attention bias in animal phobia is the 
visual search task (Flykt, Lindeberg, & Derakshan, 2012; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; 
Soares, Esteves, Lundqvist, & Öhman, 2009). In the simplest version of this task, a 
threatening target appears among neutral objects or a neutral target appears among threatening 
stimuli. The participant’s task is to detect the deviant stimulus as quickly as possible. Shorter 
reaction times (RTs) to threatening compared with neutral targets reflect vigilance to threat. 
Interestingly, the effect can be observed in both phobics and non-fearful individuals, 
suggesting that human beings are biologically prepared for the detection of phylogenetic 
threat (cf. Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Seligman, 1971). 
Indeed, a superefficient information processing system for threat may be at the basis of 
several maladaptive information processing biases (e.g., related to attention, interpretation, 
expectancies, and memory) that are thought to provoke and maintain pathological fear and 
anxiety (e.g., Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015; Butler & Mathews, 1983; Hirsch, Clark, & 
Mathews, 2006; Mathews, Mackintosh, & Fulcher, 1997; Taylor & Rachman, 1994). Notably, 
the existence of such biases in healthy individuals has not been consistently observed (e.g., 
Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendorn, 2007).  
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Recent theoretical accounts state that different types of information processing biases 
in pathological fear and anxiety (as in depression) mutually influence and stabilize or even 
enhance each other (e.g., Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015; Hirsch et al., 2006; Peschard, & 
Philippot, 2015; see also Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012; Ingram, 1984; J. M. G. 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). In fact, there is evidence that the amount of 
time that individuals spend gazing on images of spiders (a global measure of visual attention) 
is related to their expectancies of encountering these animals (Aue, Hoeppli, Piguet, 
Sterpenich, & Vuilleumier, 2013). Moreover, the nature of this association may be an 
indicator of one’s state of health: In phobic individuals, we found that shifts toward visual 
avoidance of threatening animals were accompanied by reduced expectancies of encountering 
these animals, on the one hand, and by reduced physiological arousal and reduced activity in 
the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and precuneus, on 
the other hand. Conversely, non-fearful controls displayed a positive association between 
attention engagement and encounter expectancies, as well as physiological arousal and neural 
activity in the aforementioned brain regions. Together, these findings suggest that visual 
avoidance in spider phobia may serve to downregulate threat expectancies and the associated 
negative bodily consequences, whereas healthy individuals more efficiently regulate their 
affective state by paying greater attention to potential threat sources. 
However, it is yet unclear whether the links between threat-related expectancies and 
attention are causal or even bidirectional. While it is intuitive to speculate that threat 
anticipation determines attention deployment, it is not necessarily true. At least two visual 
search studies (Aue, Chauvigné, Bristle, Okon-Singer, & Guex, 2016; Aue, Guex, Chauvigné, 
& Okon-Singer, 2013) revealed that expectancy may influence visual attention to neutral but 
not inevitably to threatening objects. Specifically, in these two experiments, spider-phobic 
and non-spider-fearful control participants were preinformed in each experimental trial about 
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the likelihood of two different animals (threatening spider vs. neutral bird) being the target in 
a subsequently presented 3 × 3 search matrix that contained eight butterflies as distractors. In 
some trials, the likelihood of a spider being the target was announced to be much higher than 
the likelihood of a neutral bird being the target; in other trials, it was the reverse; and in still 
other trials, participants were informed that there was an equal probability of either being the 
target.  
In neither study did expectancies regarding the apparition of the threat source (i.e., 
spider) significantly impact its detection (i.e., the vigilance to it). Interestingly, the absence of 
statistically significant expectancy influences on threat-related attention was not population 
specific, as it held for both spider-phobic and control participants, the latter having claimed to 
not fear spiders at all. Notably though, the same expectancies (provoked by the exact same 
expectancy cues) did influence attention to neutral bird targets in both populations. Moreover, 
this asymmetric association between expectancies and attention deployment was also shown 
by means of physiological measures (Aue et al., 2016). Although, apart from error rates and 
RTs, we found a robust indication for expectancy influences on attention to birds in pupil 
diameter and heart rate, the same expectancies did not significantly impact attention to 
spiders; only heart rate displayed a weak and transient effect of prior expectancies on the 
orientation of attention to threat. Together, these findings point to the possibility that 
expectancy-attention links fundamentally differ between threat-related and neutral targets. 
The influence of the exact same predictive cues on bird but not spider detection is 
intriguing. In fact, we had initially anticipated that encounter expectancy for spiders (i.e., 
when the likelihood of a spider target was announced to be much higher than the likelihood of 
a neutral bird target) would create a mental template of a spider that might then facilitate the 
detection of a spider (cf. predictive coding theory; Summerfield et al., 2006; Zelano, 
Mohanty, & Gottfried, 2011; for further evidence of memory-guided attention, see Duncan & 
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Humphreys, 1989; Hutchinson & Turk-Browne, 2012; Wolfe, 2010; Wolfe, Butcher, Lee, & 
Hyle, 2003). Facilitated detection following specific types of anticipation could then be a 
result of pattern matching—especially so for threatening material because, in that case, the 
encounter expectancy would also signal urgency. That our statistical analyses, which were 
inconsistent with such a point of view and opposed to findings for neutral targets, did not 
reveal significant expectancy effects for threatening targets speaks to highly specified and 
efficient detection mechanisms for threat that may function independently of momentary 
expectancy states. 
To yield better insights, in the current paper, we investigated the neural basis of this 
known expectancy-attention asymmetry in the behavioral domain. Notably, while such an 
examination may seem mostly replicative at first sight, the present investigation has a much 
greater impact. This is because knowledge about brain functioning can substantially increase 
our understanding of overt behavior. In an ideal case, assessment of neural activity patterns 
helps identify the origin and function of behavioral phenomena (Aue, Lavelle, & Cacioppo, 
2009). For instance, even if there is no behavioral difference observed between experimental 
conditions, neuroimaging data can still point to diverging underlying mechanisms (e.g., 
Beauchamp, Kahn, & Berkman, 2016; Cohen et al., 2016). 
 With respect to our own research, at least three different hypotheses can be contrasted 
and informed by neuroimaging methods. First, it could be hypothesized that expectancy 
confirmation and violation for neutral and phylogenetic threat targets are processed similarly 
in the early processing stream, with unexpected targets needing greater attention than 
expected targets. The RT asymmetry described in our previous publications (Aue, Chauvigné, 
Bristle, Okon-Singer, & Guex, 2016; Aue, Guex, Chauvigné, & Okon-Singer, 2013) could 
then arise later on in the motor preparation phase. In that case, one would predict expectancy-
related differences in attention to threat versus neutral targets to be reflected in motor activity. 
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That we did not see differences in RTs between expected and unexpected spiders—despite the 
possibility that these might be processed differently in the early processing stream—could 
result from the existence of emergency (i.e., compensation) mechanisms that provide boosted 
response preparation in the case of false (and potentially harmful) safety expectations. 
Second, differences between the targets may already arise in the early processing stream. 
While effects related to expectancy violation and confirmation might exist for both types of 
targets, they could be qualitatively different for threatening versus neutral targets (i.e., 
associated with different neural responding). The neural substrates concerned could include, 
among others, the visual cortex. In sum, both hypotheses would imply the existence of clear-
cut neural differences between unexpected and expected spiders.  
On the other hand, attentional mechanisms have often been suggested to substantially 
differ for neutral versus phylogenetic threat stimuli (e.g., Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Seligman, 
1971), with the processing of the latter being characterized by highly automatized preattentive 
processing. Correspondingly, in earlier publications on the topic (Aue, Chauvigné, Bristle, 
Okon-Singer, & Guex, 2016; Aue, Guex, Chauvigné, & Okon-Singer, 2013), we posited a 
third possibility, namely, that expectancy states often cannot successfully penetrate the 
attention system responsible for the detection of phylogenetic threat. To ensure that necessary 
available resources are fully attributed to an existing threat in the environment, attention 
deployment during rapid responding to threat could be largely shielded from top-down 
processes such as prior induced expectancies. In line with the idea of preattentive processing, 
there could instead be neural resetting whenever such a threat is presented. If this were true, 
we would not find any or only a small difference in brain activations during the detection of 
expected versus unexpected threat (while, at the same time, pronounced differences could 
arise for neutral stimuli to which other attentional mechanisms would apply). According to 
such a viewpoint, even early perceptual processing of the threatening target would be 
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uninfluenced by prior presented expectancy cues; neural resetting would prevent the organism 
from lingering in false beliefs of security and ensure rapid responding in emergency 
situations. 
 In line with this latter view, in the current study, we hypothesized that anticipation has 
only a negligible impact on neural responding related to attention deployment (and response 
preparation) for threatening objects, whereas it clearly affects neural responding related to 
attention deployment (and response preparation) for neutral objects. To this aim, we used the 
same experimental task with spider-phobic and control participants as we did previously (Aue 
et al., 2016; Aue, Guex et al., 2013), but now probed for functional brain responses (as 
assessed by magnetic resonance imaging [MRI]) that arise during task performance.  
In accordance with our previous RT and peripheral physiology findings, we first 
hypothesized that brain responses during target detection would display clear activity 
differences between expected and unexpected birds. Specifically, we predicted increased 
activity for unexpected compared with expected birds in frontoparietal and occipital sites that 
have often been reported in research on top-down control of visual attention and visual 
selection (e.g., Corbetta, 1998; Rolls, 2013; Soto, Humphreys, & Rotshtein, 2007). By 
contrast, similar effects were not anticipated for expected versus unexpected spiders.  
Second, we predicted neural responses that are characteristic of the expectancy state 
during cue presentation (i.e., degree of cue discrimination; expected target is a bird vs. a 
spider) to determine RTs to bird targets but not RTs to spider targets in the proceeding 
detection phase. This latter hypothesis thus expresses our conviction that those individuals 
whose neural activity most strongly differentiated spider from bird cues were those who were 
mostly influenced by the cues and thus subsequently showed greatest slowing of RTs to 
unexpected compared with expected birds. A resetting attention system for threat, in contrast, 
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would not be influenced by prior expectancies (i.e., cue distinctions); that is why we did not 
postulate a comparable correlation for the threatening spider targets. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-five participants (21 spider phobic; 10 male [four in the spider-phobic and six in the 
control group]), aged between 18 and 34 years (M = 23.5, SD = 4.10) were recruited via ads 
placed in university buildings, as well as on university and local websites. The study was 
embedded in a larger project investigating decision making and psychophysiological 
responses during the imagination of encounters with feared and non-feared animals. The ads 
explicitly specified these project aims. Persons interested in the study were interviewed by 
telephone and checked for criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and the 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (10th rev.; 
ICD-10; World Health Organization; 1992) for the presence or absence of spider phobia 
(adapted from Mühlberger et al., 2006). Participants were included in the study if they (a) met 
the DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10 criteria for spider phobia (spider-phobic group), or (b) fulfilled 
none of the criteria and additionally claimed to not fear spiders (control group). Another 
condition for inclusion in the study was a body mass index between 18.5 and 25. Exclusion 
criteria comprised neurological, cardiovascular, respiratory, and psychiatric diseases other 
than spider phobia, as well as medication use, pregnancy, claustrophobia, and metal implants.  
Fear of spiders was further assessed after the experiment with the French translation of 
the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995), t(43) = 14.40, p < 
.000001 (Ms = 89.6 and 28.9, SDs = 15.05 and 13.20, for phobic and control groups, 
respectively). Participants in the two groups did not differ with respect to age, t(43) = -0.93, 
ns (Ms = 22.9 and 24.0 years, SDs = 3.61 and 4.50 years, for phobic and control groups, 
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respectively); trait anxiety, t(43) = 0.67, ns (Ms = 40.9 and 39.1, SDs = 8.31 and 8.93, for 
phobic and control groups, respectively); and state anxiety, t(42) = 1.25, ns (Ms = 35.3 and 
31.9, SDs = 9.45 and 10.23, for phobic and control groups, respectively; due to time pressure, 
one participant in the control group did not complete this scale), as measured with the French 
version (Gauthier & Bouchard, 1993) of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (original English 
version: Spielberger, 1983). 
 
Stimuli and Experimental Paradigm 
The experimental task was a visual search task similar to that in Aue, Guex, et al. 
(2013) and included the presentation of three types of expectancy cues that were thought to 
facilitate or inhibit the detection of spider and bird targets in a search array (see Procedure for 
further details). 
Cues (expectancy manipulation). Three types of verbal cues were presented as text 
on the computer screen. The first, “spider 90%,” specified a 90% probability that the to-be-
detected (deviant) target in the subsequently presented search array would be a spider among 
eight butterflies. Because the target could have been either a spider or a bird, this cue 
expressed a high probability for a spider target and a low probability for a bird target. The 
second cue, “bird 90%,” specified a 90% probability that the to-be-detected target in the 
subsequently presented search array would be a bird. Thus, this cue expressed a high 
probability for a bird target and a low probability for a spider target. Finally, the third cue, 
“spider bird 50%” (for half of the participants; for the other half, the third cue was “bird 
spider 50%”), specified an equal probability for a spider or a bird to be the target in the search 
array. However, 19 (10 phobics) of 39 participants mentioned after completion of the 
experiment that they had nonetheless believed spiders to appear more frequently than birds in 
these ambiguously cued trials. Another three phobic participants mentioned having expected 
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bird targets to appear more frequently than spider targets in the ambiguous trials. 
Consequently, we did not include this condition in the current analyses (corresponding 
effects, however, corroborate our interpretation of the data from the unambiguous trials and 
can be found in the Supplementary Materials, section C: addition to Step 3 analyses). 
In reality, the spider 90% [bird 90%] cue (for simplicity, termed spider [bird] cue in 
the following) condition referred to a probability of 70% that there would actually be a spider 
[bird] target among eight butterflies in the search array presented thereafter. This discrepancy 
occurred because we had aimed at reducing the duration of the experiment while keeping the 
cues highly salient and ensuring enough trials in each experimental condition; refer to the 
Limitations section for details. In the remaining cases, either a bird [spider] target was 
presented or no deviant at all. The latter trials were included to verify that the participants 
responded on the basis of target perception. In the 50% (i.e., ambiguous, unconsidered) cue 
condition, in contrast, there was indeed an equal likelihood of either a spider or a bird being 
the target in the subsequently shown search array.  
In sum, the total number of 244 experimental trials consisted of 136 match trials (68 
spider cue–spider target trials and 68 bird cue–bird target trials), 48 mismatch trials (24 spider 
cue–bird target trials and 24 bird cue–spider target trials), 48 ambiguously cued trials (24 
ambiguous cue–spider target trials and 24 ambiguous cue–bird target trials), and 12 no-target 
trials (four trials for each spider cue, bird cue, and ambiguous cue).  
Visual search array (used to measure attention). In each trial, the search array 
consisted of a matrix of nine different animal pictures with three columns and three rows. 
There was no space in-between the pictures, and each picture within the matrix was displayed 
at 341 × 256 pixels. Stimuli consisted of (a) 30 pictures displaying spiders, all taken from the 
Geneva Affective PicturE Database (GAPED; Dan Glauser & Scherer, 2011); (b) 30 birds, 
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collected from the Internet; and (c) 100 butterflies, also collected from the Internet. The 
animals covered virtually the whole picture (see example of a search array in Figure 1).  
The butterfly distracters were selected based on the assumption that they share 
significant features with both spiders and birds (e.g., wings corresponding to birds’ wings; six 
legs and two antennas corresponding to the eight legs of spiders). Seventy-five percent of the 
butterflies were displayed from their side, clearly showing all legs and antennas. All images 
were displayed in gray scale, preventing pop-out effects based on color differences between 
stimulus categories. The stimuli in the two categories were matched for luminance and 
contrast, and spider and bird targets appeared with an equal probability in any of the nine 
different locations within the matrix.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Procedure 
Upon participants’ arrival at the laboratory, the nature of the experiment was explained 
and written informed consent was obtained (protocol approved by the local ethics committee 
and in accordance with the Helsinki Declaration of Human Rights; World Medical 
Association, 1999). The experimental task was introduced as a test of the capacity to detect 
spiders and birds in an array of butterflies and performed in an MRI scanner. After 
participants had thoroughly read the instructions for the task, they performed 10 practice trials 
to become familiar with the task. If they had no questions, they were comfortably positioned 
in an MRI scanner.  
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In each experimental trial, participants saw a fixation cross that was followed by a cue. 
The cue referred to the probability that the to-be-detected target in the subsequently presented 
search array would be a spider or a bird (see preceding section for details). After the 
presentation of the cue, another fixation cross appeared. Next, the search array consisting of 
nine pictures (either nine butterflies [no target], eight butterflies and a spider, or eight 
butterflies and a bird) was shown and the participants had to decide whether there was no 
target, or whether the target was a spider or a bird. 
Participants were instructed to react as fast and as correctly as possible. Responses 
were given by pressing three different buttons of a response button box (counterbalanced 
across participants). In total, 244 experimental trials were presented in random order in four 
runs of 61 trials with short pauses in between. The average intertrial interval was 9.5 s (range: 
9-10 s; for an example of an experimental trial [task sequence], see Figure 1). Jitters included 
between cues and targets permitted statistical separation of blood oxygenation level-
dependent responses for cues and targets. To additionally disentangle cue from target 
processing, we included 5% no-target trials. After the task, an anatomical scan of the 
participants’ brain was acquired. Outside the scanner, the participants then completed the Fear 
of Spiders Questionnaire and the trait and state scales of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
before they were debriefed. 
Functional MRI (fMRI) Data Acquisition and Image Processing 
Functional images were acquired by using a 3T whole-body MRI scanner (Trio TIM, 
Siemens) with a 32-channel head coil. We used a multiplexed EPI sequence (Feinberg et al., 
2010), allowing for a rapid temporal resolution with TR = 650 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 
50°, 36 slices, 64 × 64 pixels, 3 × 3 × 3 mm3 voxel size, and 3.9 mm slice spacing. The 
multiband acceleration factor was 4, and a parallel acquisition technique (PAT) was not used. 
Structural images were acquired with a T1-weighted 3D sequence (MPRAGE, TR/TI/TE = 
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1900/900/2.27 ms, flip angle = 9°, PAT factor = 2, voxel dimensions: 1 mm isotropic, 256 × 
256 × 192 voxels). An automatic shimming procedure was performed to minimize 
inhomogeneities of the static magnetic field. At the beginning of each session, image 
acquisition started after the recording of three dummy volumes to avoid T1 saturation effects. 
Participants wore earplugs to attenuate scanner noise; head movement was restricted by a 
vacuum pillow. 
MRI data were preprocessed and analyzed with SPM8 (Wellcome Dept. of Imaging 
Neuroscience, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Functional images were 
spatially realigned to the first volume by rigid body transformation, spatially normalized to 
the standard Montreal Neurological Institute EPI template to permit group analysis, and 
spatially smoothed with an isotropic 8-mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian 
kernel (Friston et al., 1995). 
 
Dependent Variables 
Behavioral Data. The dependent behavioral variable consisted of the participants’ 
RTs (in ms) for correct responses in the different experimental conditions of the visual search 
task.  
fMRI Data. We analyzed percentage signal changes in a whole-brain analysis (see 
subsequent section for details). 
 
Data Analysis 
Exclusion of cases. Four participants (one phobic, three control) made too many 
errors in the RT task, thus provoking a number of missing values that exceeded one third of 
all responses in at least one experimental condition (conditions here being defined by the 
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combination of the two within-subjects factors Expectancy Cue [spider, bird] and Target 
[spider, bird] included in our analyses; note that ambiguous cues were not considered because 
for these cues, most of our participants did not believe in an equal chance of a spider and a 
bird being the deviant target in the visual search array; for details, refer to the Stimuli and 
Experimental Paradigm section). In order to ensure a sufficiently high number of valid trials, 
we removed the data of these four participants altogether. The data of two additional control 
participants were removed because the first had been accidentally scanned with a different 
sequence and the second provoked too many movement artifacts. Errors in the experimental 
task of the remaining participants (20 phobic, 19 control) made up ~5.8% of all responses (SD 
= 3.2%), and the corresponding data were also excluded from RT and fMRI analyses.  
Analysis of behavioral data. A 2 × 2 × 2 mixed-factorial design resulting from the 
manipulation of the between-participants factor Population (spider phobic, control) and the 
within-participants factors Expectancy Cue (spider [spider 90%], bird [bird 90%]) and Target 
(spider, bird) was performed on the participants’ RTs (correct responses only). Significant 
effects as revealed in the performed analysis of variance (ANOVA) were further investigated 
by the use of post-hoc Tukey tests. An  level of .05 (two-tailed) was applied. All reported 
effect sizes are partial 2 and are simply noted as 2p. Because exclusion of outliers (deviating 
more than 3 SDs from an individual’s average RT; ~1% of all responses) yielded similar 
results, analyses are described for the original data only.  
Analysis of fMRI data. We performed standard analyses by using the general linear 
model as implemented in SPM8. Event-related signal changes were modeled separately for 
each participant. For each block of the experimental task, we specified a linear model that 
included 11 event types, corresponding to (a) expectancy phase: presentation of three different 
cues (spider cue, bird cue, ambiguous cue), and (b) detection phase: the six cue-target 
combinations (spider cue–spider target, spider cue–bird target, bird cue–spider target, bird 
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cue–bird target, ambiguous cue–spider target, ambiguous cue–bird target), as well as no-target 
trials and those trials in which participants gave incorrect behavioral responses. The length of 
all events was set to 0 because the perceptual processes that are supposed to happen during 
these events have a clear onset. Our multiplexed acquisition sequence with short TR (650 ms) 
allowed us to reliably distinguish different event types despite their rapid succession. 
 A constant covariate was also added representing the session-specific mean over 
scans, as well as six motion correction parameters extracted from the realignment procedure. 
The model included a high-pass filter of 128 s to remove low-frequency drift of the scanner 
and first-order auto regressive corrections for auto-correlation between scans. Effects at each 
brain voxel were estimated by using a least squares algorithm.  
 Data were analyzed in four steps. First, we investigated neural responses on 
presentation of the different cues (Step 1: manipulation check; see Supplementary Materials) 
to verify whether the induction of expectancies in our participants had been successful. 
Second, we examined whether neural activity differed between the two targets (Step 2: 
manipulation check; see Supplementary Materials) to test whether these were processed 
differently. Third, we investigated our major research question, namely, whether, during 
visual search, expectancies differentially modulated responses to bird but not to or less to 
spider targets (Step 3). Related to this issue, we further examined whether neural activity in 
the expectancy phase could successfully predict RTs to bird but not to spider targets in the 
visual search task (Step 4). Analyses related to the latter two steps are detailed below and 
were conducted as follows. 
 Step 3: Differences in neural activity between unexpected and expected (i.e., 
differentially cued) targets. According to our hypothesis of different attentional mechanisms 
applying to the detection of phylogenetic threat versus neutral stimuli, with a resetting 
attentional system in case of spider detections, we hypothesized expectancy effects to be 
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clearly visible in neural responses to bird targets but not in those to spider targets. To test this 
hypothesis, we performed a whole-brain analysis in which we first contrasted responses to 
spider targets that were preceded by bird cues relative to responses to spider targets that were 
preceded by spider cues (both bird cue > spider cue and spider cue > bird cue; performed on 
spider targets only). Two different versions of these contrasts were calculated: (a) for both 
populations together and (b) for spider phobics versus controls (interaction contrast), 
permitting the identification of spider phobics’ particularities in initial responses toward 
incongruently cued spider targets. Thus, the latter interaction contrast tested whether the 
differences revealed by the two contrasts specified above (bird cue > spider cue and spider 
cue > bird cue, performed on spider targets only) were statistically different between phobics 
and controls (phobics > controls; note that testing the opposite direction was not necessary 
because the cue contrasts were already tested in both directions). If there was a significant 
difference, its nature was identified by looking separately into phobics and controls. The same 
contrasts were performed for the bird targets: bird targets preceded by spider cues versus bird 
targets preceded by bird cues (also both directions; version a: both populations; version b: 
contrasting the two populations).  
To avoid alpha inflation, we report only significant clusters containing at least 26 
contiguous voxels at p < .001. This critical cluster size was calculated by a Monte Carlo 
simulation with 10,000 iterations, assuming some interdependence between voxels (8-mm 
FWHM), resulting in a corrected whole-brain p-value of .001. All parametric maps were 
rendered on sections of the average T1-weighted template brain of all participants. 
Step 4: Prediction of RTs for the detection of unexpected versus expected targets by 
neural activity for spider versus bird cues in the expectancy phase. We hypothesized that 
selective modulation of brain activity by the expectancy cues would affect the detection of 
birds but not the detection of spiders in the subsequent visual search task. The latter relates to 
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our conviction that participants whose neural activity most strongly differentiated between 
spider and bird cues were those who were mostly influenced by the cues and thus 
subsequently showed greatest slowing of RTs to unexpected compared with expected birds. A 
resetting attentional system for phylogenetic threat, in contrast, would prohibit such an effect 
from being seen in the RTs for spider targets. To examine this hypothesis, we adopted a 
whole-brain between-participants approach and correlated participants’ neural responses to 
spider versus bird cues (spider cue–bird cue) in the expectancy phase with the participants’ 
RTs for unexpected versus expected spiders (RT unexpected–RT expected); we tested for 
both a positive and a negative association. Similarly, we correlated participants' neural 
responses to bird versus spider cues (bird cue–spider cue) in the expectancy phase with the 
participants’ RTs for unexpected versus expected birds (RT unexpected–RT expected). 
Comparable analyses as described for Step 3 were calculated. Concretely, we performed both 
a merged analysis for both populations (version a) and a contrast of the two populations 
(phobics–controls; version b), the latter analysis relating to a comparison of the size of the 
observed correlations between phobics and controls for each voxel. In the case of significant 
version b effects, we additionally performed separate analyses for phobics and controls. 
Again, a cluster threshold of 26 contiguous voxels at p < .001 was applied. 
Results 
Behavioral Data 
The 2 (Population: spider phobic, control) × 2 (Expectancy Cue: spider, bird) × 2 
(Target: spider, bird) ANOVA on participants’ RTs yielded a significant main effect of 
Population, F(1, 37) = 9.59, p < .005, 2p = .21. Overall, phobics displayed shorter RTs than 
did controls (Ms = 1053.8 and 1181.9 ms for spider phobics and controls, respectively). The 
ANOVA further yielded a significant main effect of Expectancy Cue, F(1, 37) = 49.42, p < 
.0000001, 2 p = .57, because of faster responses following bird cues overall (Ms = 1162.6 and 
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1073.1 ms for spider cue and bird cue, respectively). There was also a significant main effect 
of Target, F(1, 37) = 216.22, p < .0000001, 2 p = .85 (Ms = 986.5 and 1249.2 ms for spider 
target and bird target, respectively; Figure 2), corresponding to a global attention bias toward 
the spider targets.  
Both of the latter effects were qualified by the significant interaction Expectancy Cue 
× Target, F(1, 37) = 16.46, p < .0005, 2 p = .31, resulting from the fact that expectancy 
effects were limited to bird targets. Post hoc Tukey tests for this interaction showed no 
difference between the expectancy cues for spider targets (p = .23; Ms = 1004.3 and 968.8 ms 
for spider cue and bird cue, respectively), whereas RTs were longer for those bird targets that 
had been preceded by spider cues rather than bird cues (i.e., that were unexpected rather than 
expected; p = .0002; Ms = 1320.8 and 1177.5 ms for spider cue and bird cue, respectively).   
Finally, the significant interaction Population × Target, F(1, 37) = 33.28, p < 
.0000005, 2 p = .47, arose because phobics and controls did not display different RTs for the 
bird targets (Tukey test for this pairwise comparison: p = 0.94; Ms = 1236.7 and 1261.7 ms 
for phobics and controls, respectively), but phobics were faster at detecting spiders than were 
controls (p = .0002; Ms = 871.0 and 1102.1 ms for phobics and controls, respectively). Both 
groups were characterized by shorter RTs for spider compared with bird targets (both ps = 
.0002; i.e., attention bias for threat). Neither the interaction Population × Expectancy Cue nor 
the interaction Population × Expectancy Cue × Target reached significance, Fs(1, 37) = 0.24 
and 2.29, ps = .63 and .14, 2s = .01 and 06, respectively.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
 Insert Figure 2 about here  
-------------------------------------------------- 
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fMRI Data 
In the following, we describe fMRI data related to the test of our hypothesis that 
expectancies successfully influence attention deployment for bird targets but—due to a 
resetting attentional system for threat detection— the same is not the case for spider targets. 
Results regarding neural activity for spider versus bird cues in the expectancy phase (without 
consideration of the later-presented targets) are presented in the Supplementary Materials and 
Table S1 (Step 1); results regarding neural activity for spider versus bird targets in the 
detection phase (without consideration of the previously presented cues) are presented in the 
Supplementary Materials and Table S2 (Step 2). 
Differences in neural activity between unexpected and expected targets (Step 3). 
First, we compared the neural activations related to unexpected spiders and expected spiders 
during spider detection in the visual search task. To this aim, we calculated both the contrast 
[spider target preceded by bird cue] – [spider target preceded by spider cue] and the same 
contrast in the opposite direction [spider target preceded by spider cue] – [spider target 
preceded by bird cue]. In line with our predictions, there were no significant effects: Neither 
was there a significant difference in neural responding for unexpected versus expected spiders 
(both directions of the above specified contrasts) when both populations were analyzed 
together (version a; see Method section for details), nor were these contrasts any different 
between the two populations (interaction contrast; i.e., version b).  
Instead, in agreement with our RT data, our brain data revealed a robust influence of 
expectancies on bird detection (Table 1, Figure 3). The combined analysis of both populations 
(version a) demonstrated that expectancies evoked by the preceding cues indeed powerfully 
influenced brain responses to the bird targets. Most notably, unexpected birds compared with 
expected birds produced greater activity in the inferior frontal gyrus in both spider phobics 
and controls. In addition, our participants demonstrated increased activity in various 
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dorsolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal areas, as well as in the superior and inferior parietal 
lobule. Finally, contrasting the responses of the two populations (interaction contrast; i.e., 
version b) did not yield any significant difference. 
Together, these results support the notion that the detection of threat-related stimuli 
did not or only marginally engaged different brain areas when expected or unexpected, 
whereas the detection of unexpected neutral stimuli, in line with our hypotheses, activated 
areas involved in attention control and task switching. Moreover, results observed were 
independent of fear level (i.e., population). 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Prediction of RTs for unexpected versus expected targets by neural activity for 
spider versus bird cues in the expectancy phase (Step 4). We hypothesized that participants 
who most strongly differentiated between the expectancy cues during presentation of the cues 
would be those who showed a stronger influence of these cues on their later RTs for bird 
targets. Because of the assumed resetting nature of attentional mechanisms characteristic of 
the detection of phylogenetic threat, no such association was predicted for the spider targets. 
To investigate whether RTs for unexpected versus expected targets could be predicted by cue-
specific brain activity in the expectancy phase, we took the fMRI response to bird cue versus 
spider cue in the expectancy phase and correlated it with RTs for unexpected versus expected 
targets in the detection phase (refer to Method section for further details).  
Notably, analyses performed for spider targets did not yield any significant activation 
clusters, further underscoring that expectancy influences on attention deployment to spiders 
was negligible in our experiment. By contrast, for bird targets, activity in the expectancy 
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phase significantly predicted the facilitation effect of the expectancy cues on detection speed 
(Table 2; Figure 4). The whole-brain parametric analysis across both populations (version a) 
showed that this facilitation effect by the expectancy cues on RTs was associated with 
selectively increased activity in the precuneus (Figure 4a). Participants who displayed greater 
precuneus activity for bird compared with spider cues in the expectancy phase were those 
who showed the greatest increase in RTs for unexpected compared with expected bird targets.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Contrasts of the correlations between the two populations (version b) yielded a 
significant difference within the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC; Figure 4b). Whereas 
phobics displayed a negative correlation between PCC activity related to bird–spider cues in 
the expectancy phase and the facilitation effect expressed in the RTs for bird targets, controls 
showed a positive correlation. 
Discussion 
In the current paper, we describe a visual search task and resulting RT and fMRI data 
that clearly demonstrate asymmetric effects of expectancies on the detection of neutral (bird) 
compared with threat-related (spider) targets. Longer RTs for unexpected compared with 
expected birds indicate that bird detection was strongly influenced by the predictive cues 
presented prior to search. Detection of spiders, in contrast, was unaffected by the preceding 
cues. Results are thus highly consistent with previous studies (that were based on the same 
experimental paradigm) in which RTs (Aue et al., 2013) and autonomic nervous system 
measures were used (Aue et al., 2016).  
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More important, here we additionally delineated the neural basis underlying this 
differential link between expectancy and attention when participants searched for 
phylogenetic threat versus neutral information. We had hypothesized the existence of 
resetting attentional mechanisms for threat detection that function to safeguard survival in 
emergency situations. Greater resistance to expectancy would ensure adequate responding to 
threats even when observers are unprepared. Whether prior expectancies are confirmed or not 
should be less relevant in threat-related emergency situations. This issue may instead be 
processed somewhat independently later on, when the observer is safe again and has sufficient 
time for it.  
Accumulating evidence supports such a point of view: Neural responses as well as 
RTs and peripheral physiological responses in both the current and earlier investigations 
(Aue, Guex et al., 2013; Aue et al., 2016) are consistent with it. Specifically, during target 
detection, coherent neural differences between the expectancy cues were observed only for 
bird targets in both populations (Step 3): Increased brain activity in various frontal and 
parietal regions in the detection phase, as well as longer RTs for unexpected compared with 
expected birds, reflects an impressive influence of these cues on processing and overt 
behavior. By contrast, comparable differences were not found between unexpected and 
expected spiders.  
Similarly, our additional parametric analysis (Step 4) demonstrated that response 
facilitation by the cues was restricted to the detection of bird targets. This facilitation was 
predicted by neural activity in the precuneus and PCC during the expectancy phase. 
Participants who were characterized by stronger precuneus activity for bird compared with 
spider cues in the expectancy phase were those who showed the largest increase in RTs to 
unexpected compared with expected bird targets (PCC results are discussed in more detail 
later). By contrast and consistent with the idea of a resetting attention system, such 
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expectancy-related neural activity had no predictive value for RTs to spider targets. Notably, 
the same neural activity that effectively predicted the RTs for bird targets did not predict RTs 
for spider targets. Therefore, the observed asymmetry in expectancy influences on the 
processing of the two different targets cannot be explained by possible differences in cue 
effectiveness. 
Along these lines, we found clearly distinct neural response patterns associated with 
the expectancy cues across target conditions (see Supplementary Materials, Step 1, for 
details), especially in the phobics. This observation underscores once more that the cues had 
been effective and had a high significance for these participants. Our findings hence highlight 
that recognition of different likelihoods for the apparition of spider targets does not suffice to 
drive attention orientation toward or away from threatening spider targets. Instead, these data 
favor the idea that early automatic attention deployment to threat (as revealed in the 
participants’ RTs)—as opposed to attention deployment to neutral events—is indeed more 
independent from prior expectancy states. 
A review of the literature performed by Rolls (2013) suggests that attention and 
expectancies recruit a common neural network: Both cognition (encompassing expectancies) 
and attention can exert top-down influences on the processing of bottom-up sensory inputs, 
and this influence is mediated in part by the ACC and the OFC. Such top-down influences 
could promote the activation of selective neuronal assemblies in the early information 
processing stream while simultaneously inhibiting others. Hence, specific stimulus 
representations will be enhanced and others suppressed (e.g., Desimone & Duncan, 1995), so 
that subsequent processing of incoming information will be biased in favor of currently 
relevant content.  
Consistent with this view, in the present study, we indeed found the ACC to be 
implicated in expectancy- and attention- (i.e., target-) related processing. Notably, however, 
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greater ACC activity for unexpected compared with expected targets was observed for neutral 
targets only, suggesting that the top-down mechanisms highlighted in Rolls’ (2013) review 
may not generally apply. In the case of phylogenetic threat, attention mechanisms may bypass 
or override expectancy-based selection that is based on higher cortical structures in order to 
achieve more efficient, quick survival responses (cf. LeDoux & Phelps, 2000).  
Mohanty and Sussman (2013) proposed a fronto-parietal attention network consisting 
of the frontal eye fields, the posterior parietal cortex, and the PCC to be responsible for 
anticipation-based visual search regarding threat stimuli. These are exactly the areas we found 
to be implicated in expectancy-related processing of our bird targets (unexpected vs. expected 
contrasts [Step 3]; but note that Mohanty et al., 2009, in opposition to our own findings, 
reported these regions to be implicated in cue instead of target processing). What is more, 
these regions were also among the brain regions whose activity during the expectancy phase 
(i.e., cue processing) predicted RTs for unexpected versus expected bird targets (Step 4). Yet, 
these same areas had no predictive power for the detection of unexpected compared with 
expected spider targets in our study, which might well correspond to the finding of diminished 
capacity to activate critical neural integration centers (such as the precuneus) when spider 
phobics expect to encounter spiders (Aue et al., 2015).  
Unlike observations outlined in the current paper, Mohanty et al. (2009) reported the 
fronto-parietal network to be functionally connected with the amygdala and to be 
characterized by enhanced activity during the anticipation of angry faces, which they 
interpreted as indicating preferential processing of threat (for similar results, see also Hahn & 
Gronlund, 2007; M. A. Williams, Moss, Bradshaw, & Mattingley, 2005). The difference 
between the conclusions of the Mohanty study and our own can be related to different factors. 
First, all of these authors used human faces instead of animals as target stimuli. Despite the 
fact that both stimulus categories are considered to be a phylogenetic threat, these differences 
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might imply that the involved neurocognitive processes differ. Second, the number of items in 
the visual search task concurrently displayed in the Mohanty et al. (2009) study was 
considerably lower. Third, although Mohanty et al. (2009) varied anticipation states on a trial-
to-trial basis, in their case, cues additionally gave spatial information about the to-be-detected 
targets. Therefore, visual search was considerably restricted, namely, to half of the items in 
the already small search matrix. In fact, research has shown that increasing the number of 
items displayed in a search display can considerably change effects observed in visual search 
studies (e.g., Lipp, Derakshan, Waters, & Logies, 2004, Experiment 1; Öhman, Flykt, and 
Esteves, 2001). 
The fact that behavioral and neural responses showed similar patterns for both spider 
phobics and controls (the latter having been characterized by particularly low spider fear) is 
further consistent with the idea that stimulus saliency in our experiment has not been driven 
by conscious fear, but by some primitive evolutionary significance (Öhman et al., 2001; 
Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Seligman, 1971). Thus, phylogenetic threat detection may, to a 
certain extent, be independent of expectancy state, and this may hold for different fear levels. 
Consequently, even if it can be argued that threat-related information processing in phobics is 
generally abnormal (indeed, we found stronger responding to the spider cues and to the spider 
targets for phobics compared with controls; see Supplementary Materials, Steps 1 and 2, for 
details), the current data suggest strong commonalities between phobics and controls in the 
translation of expectancies into attention deployment. 
The asymmetric expectancy effects observed in the current study also need to be 
interpreted in the context of earlier scientific papers on attention bias, papers that did not 
consider prior expectancies. For instance, Öhman et al. (2001) postulated different processing 
modes for phylogenetic threat and neutral targets in visual search tasks. Whereas the 
processing of fear-relevant stimulus material would be characterized by preattentive parallel 
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processing, fear-irrelevant stimulus material would be characterized by postattentive serial 
processing. Accordingly, brain activity in our study differed massively between the two target 
types (see Supplementary Materials, Step 2, for details). These neural data complement our 
earlier observation that the processing of spider targets compared with bird targets in the 
visual search task is characterized by increased heart and respiration rates (Aue et al., 2016). 
Together, these findings suggest faster processing and greater processing impact (i.e., 
response mobilization) of spider compared with bird targets and support the hypothesis of the 
existence of an innate fear module (Davis & Lang, 2003; LeDoux & Phelps, 2000; Öhman & 
Mineka, 2001) that facilitates attention orientation to phylogenetic threat stimuli (cf. Yiend, 
2010; but see Lipp, 2006, for criticisms regarding this issue). 
 Our findings may represent a “default” response pattern according to which the 
detection of threat in the environment is prioritized. This default mode responding possibly 
relies more strongly on the activation of basic subcortical structures such as the amygdala 
(e.g., LeDoux & Phelps, 2000) and somewhat limits the influence of higher cortical structures 
that exert top-down influences (e.g., those provoked by our cues; see Step 1 analyses in the 
Supplementary Materials for higher cortical structures associated with cue processing) when 
fast responding is requested. This may also explain why we did not find any implication of the 
OFC in expectancy variations while participants attended to threatening targets. Notably 
though, our comparison of spider and bird targets (Step 2), without simultaneous 
consideration of expectancy states and other research in the area, has shown the OFC to be 
critically implicated in the processing of threatening items. These threat-associated neural 
responses, which are unmodulated by expectancy variations, may be related to the regulation 
of (phobic) fear (e.g., Hermann et al., 2009) and serve to downsize amygdalar and insular 
activity (Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008).  
Expectancies and Attention to Threat  29 
 
 
It remains to be clarified why phobics and controls displayed oppositely directed 
correlations between PCC activity for bird versus spider cues in the expectancy phase and 
RTs for unexpected versus expected bird targets when we tested the predictive power of 
expectancy-related neural activity for subsequent RTs (Step 4; Figure 4b; negative correlation 
for phobics, positive correlation for controls). The PCC has been shown to be essential for 
selective attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) and suggested to constitute a central hub that 
relates motivation and top-down control of attention (Small et al., 2005). Along these lines, it 
has been found that the more the PCC is activated during the stimulus encoding phase, the 
greater the impact of the respective piece of information on later cognitive processing (e.g., 
Schiller, Freeman, Mitchell, Uleman, & Phelps, 2009). The data presented here propose that 
expectancy-related PCC activity may promote attentional shifting for neutral targets, but 
differently in phobics and controls. The greater the PCC activity in controls was for bird cues 
compared with spider cues, the more these participants benefitted from the presentation of the 
cues, as reflected in their RTs for bird target detection. This result is consistent with Schiller 
et al.’s (2009) observation of a greater impact of to-be-encoded material on later cognitive 
processing: Increased PCC activity for bird cues rather than spider cues may correspond with 
increased processing depth, thus hastening the subsequent detection of birds. Greater PCC 
activity for spider than for bird cues in phobics, in contrast, may go hand in hand with an 
increased alarm state, which then, as a by-product, hastens detection of non-threatening bird 
targets. That these effects in controls and phobics were restricted to the bird targets might 
again be explained by the existence of specialized fear pathways that preclude such situation-
specific variations in the overall attentive state from influencing the detection of threat in the 
environment. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the data we present here, for now, are not 
congruent with the idea of bidirectional influences between different types of cognitive bias in 
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fear and anxiety (see Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015; Hirsch et al., 2006; Peschard, & Philippot, 
2015). However, they do not allow dismissal of the opposite influence, namely, an impact of 
attention deployment on expectancy formation. They further do not rule out that the influence 
of one bias on the other is mediated by a third, here unconsidered, bias (e.g., memory bias, 
interpretation bias; see Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015, for elaboration). In addition, it is still 
possible that expectancy influences on attention deployment become more prominent when 
additional factors are considered. For example, motivation, current goals, and task relevance 
have been shown to modulate responses to targets (Engelmann & Pessoa, 2014; Lichtenstein-
Vidne, Henik & Safadi, 2007; Sussman, Jin & Mohanty, 2016; Vogt, De Houwer, Moors, 
Van Damme & Crombez, 2010) and might therefore moderate the impact of expectancies on 
attention deployment to threat. The influence of these factors should hence be investigated in 
future research. 
Limitations 
We told our participants that, in 90% of all trials, the cues would correctly predict the 
targets in the visual search task. In reality, however, cues correctly primed the targets in only 
70% of the trials. This discrepancy resulted from the fact that we aimed to ensure a 
sufficiently high number of valid samples also for those trials that incorrectly primed the 
targets. If participants recognized the discrepancy, they may have lowered their trust in the 
presented cues, thus weakening the intended effects of the cue. Yet, there are important 
counter-arguments regarding such distrust in the cues. First, participants’ behavioral and 
neural responses to the bird targets was strongly influenced by the presented cues (notably, 
the same cues could have predicted a bird or a spider target). Second, 70% (instead of 90%) 
correct priming constitutes much higher than chance predictive power, and the participants 
should have nevertheless experienced an increased likelihood of the cued target being the 
deviant animal in the search matrix. Third, Entel, Tzelgov, and Bereby-Meyer (2014) 
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presented data that show that instructions about proportions of presented stimulus categories 
that do not match real proportions can suffice to provoke specific effects in participants’ 
behavior. 
 We might also be criticized because the lack of a correlation with brain activity for 
spider targets (Step 4) could be due to a somewhat restricted variance in RTs for unexpected 
versus expected spider targets (compared with unexpected vs. expected bird targets; see 
Figure 4a, bottom, for details). However, there was still considerable variability, and close 
consideration of Figure 4a shows that reduced variability cannot explain the lack of statistical 
significance. There simply appears to be no comparable association as in the case of birds. 
Equally important, interpretation of Step 4 findings is identical to our conclusions drawn from 
the RT data and our Step 3 results (which cannot be explained by restricted variance in RTs). 
The fact that we did not observe any significant difference between unexpected and expected 
spiders, but that we see, at the same time, meaningful and strong differences between 
unexpected and expected birds, is therefore supportive of the idea of a resetting attentional 
system whenever spiders have been presented in the visual search array. Together, these data 
hence corroborate our hypothesis that the detection of spider targets is more resistant to 
expectancy influences than is the detection of bird targets. 
 Despite this, from the present study data, we cannot conclude that phylogenetic threat 
detection is altogether unaffected by prior expectancies. Our statistical analyses for spiders 
cannot confirm a null hypothesis, and, as discussed in the previous section, there are in fact 
studies that show an influence of expectancies on the detection of angry faces (cf. Hahn & 
Gronlund, 2007; Mohanty et al., 2009; M. A. Williams, Moss, Bradshaw, & Mattingley, 
2005). Therefore, we do not dismiss the possibility that the inclusion of different stimuli and 
use of other experimental paradigms can still reveal expectancy influences on attentional 
deployment to phylogenetic threat. Yet, apart from our own study, existing studies showing 
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an influence of prior expectancies on attention to threat did not directly compare effects for 
neutral versus phylogenetic threat stimuli. Our observation of a strong influence of prior 
expectancies on the detection of the neutral birds, while the exact same prior expectancies did 
not significantly impact the detection of spiders, is thus suggestive in that attentional 
mechanisms for phylogenetic threat might be more difficultly penetrated by top-down 
processing.  
However, these results clearly remain to be replicated with other types of stimuli (e.g., 
snakes, angry faces) and in other experimental settings. For instance, it is possible that the fact 
that we informed our participants that we investigated brain responses in response to different 
animals somehow changed their natural responding. Certainly, these contextual factors may 
have affected our participants’ expectancies and thereby, their detection speed. Yet, for 
several reasons, we do not think that our study information can completely explain the 
asymmetric expectancy effects for spider versus bird targets in our study. First, our 
participants were not recruited to participate in an experiment labeled spider detection. 
Instead, the study aims specified that we were interested in responses to spiders and birds 
with no special emphasis on spiders. The appearance of spiders may have altered this 
balanced situation for the phobic participants; however, it cannot explain the findings in the 
control group. Second, our participants were also asked about fear of birds in the telephone 
interview preceding the study so as not to evoke the impression that we were interested only 
in spiders. Third, prioritized processing of spiders compared with birds has been found in 
numerous studies not considering prior expectancies, namely, in the area of attention bias. 
This suggests that different mechanisms do indeed act during the detection of threatening 
spiders and neutral birds. A resetting attentional system for threat detection (i.e., preattentive 
processing) may prevent fatal interference by various disturbing external and internal factors, 
one of these being prior expectancies.  
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Summary and Conclusions 
We investigated the idea of attentional mechanisms that are specific to the processing 
of phylogenetic threat. Concretely, we had hypothesized that attention deployment in early 
responding to threat (i.e., preattentive processing; e.g., Öhman & Mineka, 2001) is largely 
shielded from top-down processes such as prior induced expectancies. Instead, preattentive 
processing would be characterized by a reset regarding currently subsisting, possibly 
irrelevant, content. Such a mechanism would ensure that necessary available resources can be 
fully attributed to existing threat in the environment. Because of their lower survival 
relevance, no such insulated stimulus processing was predicted for neutral stimuli. 
Accordingly, we tested whether specific expectancies modulate detection speed for neutral 
targets but do not modulate it or modulate it less for threatening targets. As predicted, 
expectancy cues evoked specific behavioral and neural expectancy states and were efficient 
modulators of the time to detect bird targets. More important, consistent with our hypotheses, 
there was no impact of expectancy cues on RTs for spider targets—either in the phobics or in 
the controls. Because the same expectancy cues were used for spiders and birds, the missing 
effect for spider detections cannot be explained by an inefficient expectancy manipulation. 
Instead, there must be something special about spider detections.  
Our data are in line with the idea of the existence of dedicated fear processing 
pathways. Such pathways may guarantee the automatic processing of threat stimuli by 
safeguarding independence from explicit expectancies, thereby ensuring survival. 
Consequently, human beings will not be hindered in their detection of threat and the 
preparation of an adaptive, possibly life-saving response—even if they momentarily falsely 
believe in safety.  
Moreover, we were able to show that the asymmetric effect observed in RTs was not 
simply the result of accelerated motor preparation in the case of unexpected phylogenetic 
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threat, but that it must arise much earlier in the processing stream. Otherwise, we would have 
expected to see more pronounced effects in neural activity when comparing unexpected and 
expected spider targets; effects that would at least partly overlap with those found for the 
neutral targets. In sum, the answer to our initial question of whether anticipation can be seen 
as a propelling force for adaptive attention deployment must, for now, be “no” or “not 
necessarily.” Anticipation may well be a key characteristic of fear as suggested by Aristotle, 
but it seems that it can determine attention deployment only under specific circumstances, 
namely, when the number of distractors is low and additional spatial information is provided 
beforehand, under particular motivational conditions, or when time for responding is 
sufficiently long. Thus, expectancies are likely not always powerful enough to influence the 
deployment of attention to threat.   
Of note, we have used a similar experimental design in a gambling context in which 
visual cues predicted gains and losses (Kress, Bristle, & Aue, 2018). In contrast to our 
findings in the current study, we did find expectancy influences on attention to loss targets in 
the visual search display, as well as for gain targets. Therefore, the effects reported in the 
current paper do not seem to generalize to other types of negative stimuli or to emotional 
stimuli in general (see Kress & Aue, 2017, for a detailed description of potential neural 
mechanisms regarding expectancy–attention interactions in positive affect).  Thus, these data, 
together with the present findings, point to the special character of the processing of 
phylogenetic threat. Future studies should investigate other types of (phylogenetic) threat 
stimuli to further determine the degree of specificity of our observations.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Example of experimental trial. Spider 90%, bird 90%, and spider-bird 50% refer to 
the expectancy of the target to be a spider or a bird. Only the spider 90% and the bird 90% 
cues are considered in our analyses. Jitters have been introduced to prevent habituation.  
Figure 2. Reaction times as a function of Population, Expectancy, and Target. Spider cue and 
bird cue refer to the spider 90% and bird 90% cues, respectively. Error bars depict standard 
errors. *p < .001 
Figure 3. Areas displaying differences on viewing unexpected versus expected birds in the 
target detection phase. ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; CB = cerebellum; CUN = cuneus; 
IFG = inferior frontal gyrus; IPL = inferior parietal lobule; MeFG = medial frontal gyrus; 
MFG = middle frontal gyrus; MTG = middle temporal gyrus; SPL = superior parietal lobule.   
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; spider phobics (n = 20) and controls (n = 19) combined.  
Figure 4. Prediction of reaction times (RTs) for the detection of bird targets (unexpected–
expected) by neural activity (bird cue–spider cue) in the expectancy phase. p < .001; k ≥ 26 
voxels. (a) Spider phobics (n = 20) and controls (n = 19) combined (for comparison reasons, 
prediction of RTs for spider targets by neural activity in the precuneus is displayed as well; 
bottom) and (b) differences between spider phobics and controls. PCC = posterior cingulate 
cortex; PCU = precuneus. *p < .01; **p > .0005. 
  
 
 
 
Table 1 
Areas Displaying Differential Activity for Unexpected Versus Expected Birds: Detection 
Phase 
        
Peak 
MNI Coordinates 
Region 
    
k t 
 
x y z 
                      
           
Unexpected > Expected         
Both Populations (version a)         
IFG, MFG, INS 
  
1002 5.84  45 44 -14 
MeFG, ACC 
 
253 4.31  6 41 43 
IFG 
   
44 4.29  -30 23 -8 
MFG 
    
30 3.89  -39 26 34 
SPL, IPL 
    
119 3.66  -27 -67 46 
IPL, SPL 
  
155 4.01  48 -52 43 
CUN, LING 
   
126 4.00  12 -85 7 
CB 
    
216 4.70  -9 -76 -29 
CB  48 4.03  27 -61 -32 
CB  29 3.82  -27 -67 -32 
CB 
 
40 4.09  0 -55 -35 
                      
 
Note. n = 20 spider phobics and 19 controls. k = cluster size in number of voxels; peak MNI 
coordinates = Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates referring to the maximally 
activated voxel in each cluster; ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; CB = cerebellum; CUN = 
cuneus; IFG = inferior frontal gyrus; INS = insula; IPL = inferior parietal lobule; LING = 
lingual gyrus; MeFG = medial frontal gyrus; MFG = middle frontal gyrus; SPL = superior 
parietal lobule. Version a refers to the contrast version performed (see text for details). 
puncorr < .001; k ≥ 26. 
 
Table 2 
Activity in the Expectancy Phase (Bird–Spider) Predicting the Facilitation Effect of the 
Expectancy Cues on Later Detection of Birds as Seen in RTs (RTbird unexpected–RTbird expected) 
        
Peak 
MNI Coordinates 
  
Region 
    
k t 
 
x y z   
                        
           
  
           
Both Populations  
(version a)                     
  
PCU   42 4.06  -6 -55 46   
Spider Phobic < Control 
(version b)           
  
PCC     28 4.22  -18 -61 13   
             
 
Note. n = 20 spider phobics and 19 controls. k = cluster size in number of voxels; peak MNI 
Coordinates = Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates referring to the maximally 
activated voxel in each cluster; PCC = posterior cingulate gyrus; PCU = precuneus. Versions 
a and b refer to the contrast versions performed (see text for details). 
puncorr < .001; k ≥ 26. 
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A. Neural responses on presentation of different cues (manipulation check, Step 1)   
First, we verified whether the induction of expectancies in our participants had been 
successful. Correspondingly, we performed a whole-brain analysis in which we contrasted 
responses to spider versus bird cues in the expectancy phase (both spider cue > bird cue and 
bird cue > spider cue). Two different versions of these contrasts were calculated: (a) for both 
populations together and (b) for spider phobics versus controls (interaction contrast), 
permitting the identification of spider phobics’ particularities in initial responses toward 
spider cues (relative to non-phobogenic material). Thus, the latter interaction contrast tested 
whether the differences revealed by the two contrasts specified above (spider cue > bird cue 
and bird cue > spider cue, performed on spider targets only) were statistically different 
between phobics and controls (phobics > controls; note that testing the opposite direction was 
not necessary this time because the cue contrasts were already tested in both directions). If 
there was a significant difference, we looked separately into spider phobics (version c) and 
controls (version d). To avoid alpha inflation, we report only significant clusters containing at 
least 26 contiguous voxels at p < .001. This critical cluster size was calculated by a Monte 
Carlo simulation with 10,000 iterations, assuming some interdependence between voxels (8-
mm FWHM), resulting in a corrected whole-brain p-value of .001. All parametric maps were 
rendered on sections of the average T1-weighted template brain of all participants. 
 Combining the two groups of participants (version a) yielded two significant clusters 
in the visual cortex that were more strongly activated for spider than for bird cues (Figure S1). 
 
Figure S1. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing spider compared with bird cues in the expectancy 
phase; version a: spider phobics (n = 20) and controls (n = 19) combined.             
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; spider cue > bird cue. See Table S1 for definitions of abbreviations. 
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When both groups of participants were contrasted with each other (version b), 
unsurprisingly, the spider phobics showed more pronounced activity for spider compared with 
bird cues in various brain areas (Figure S2).  
 
Figure S2. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing spider compared with bird cues in the expectancy 
phase; version b: spider phobics (n = 20) > controls (n = 19).       
 p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; spider cue > bird cue. See Table S1 for definitions of abbreviations. 
 
Specifically, in phobics (version c), differential increases for spider versus bird cues 
were observed in the lateral prefrontal cortex—the dorsal and the ventral part—as well as in 
the ACC, precuneus, amygdala, insula, and thalamus (see Figure S3 for a contrast in spider 
phobics only; see Table S1 for completeness). This clearly demonstrates that the induction of 
expectancies was successful.  
 
Figure S3. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing spider versus bird cues in the expectancy phase; 
version c: spider phobics (n = 20).        
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; spider cue > bird cue. See Table S1 for definitions of abbreviations. 
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In controls (version d), activation differences between spider cues and bird cues were 
not as pronounced. One the one hand, greater activity for spider cues compared with bird cues 
was limited to visual areas in the lingual gyrus and cuneus; on the other hand, they showed 
greater activity for bird cues compared with spider cues in a cluster within the inferior and 
middle frontal gyri (Figure S4). 
                 
Figure S4. Areas displaying differences on viewing spider versus bird cues in the expectancy phase; 
version d: controls (n = 19).        
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; left: spider cue > bird cue; right: bird cue > spider cue. See Table S1 for definitions of 
abbreviations. 
 
  
x = 
45 
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Table S1 
Areas Displaying Differential Activity for Spider Cues Versus Bird Cues: Expectancy Phase 
        
Peak 
MNI Coordinates 
Region 
    
k t 
 
x y z 
                      
           
Spider Cue > Bird Cue         
Both Populations (version a)         
MOG, SOG, IOG, CUN, LING, FFG, 
CB   966 8.30  -15 -91 -11 
LING, CUN, MOG   232 8.12  18 -97 -2 
Spider Phobic > Control (version b)         
IFG, INS, MeFG, ACC, MFG, SFG, 
STG, MTG, ITG, THA, LN, CN, CL, 
AMYG, HIP, PHG, MB, Pons, 
PreCG, FFG,    4390 5.33  48 11 -26 
ACC   31 3.92  -9 -4 31 
SFG, MFG   57 4.25  -27 47 40 
MFG, IFG, PreCG   36 3.75  42 -1 34 
STG, MTG, PCC, PCU, PCL, IPL, 
PoCG, PreCG, MFG, INS    739 5.34  -60 -37 16 
CUN, PCU, PCC   454 5.06  9 -82 34 
CUN, MOG   99 4.22  12 -97 7 
PCU   36 3.77  -24 -55 46 
CN, LN   73 3.89  -12 -1 16 
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CB, FFG   936 4.94  -21 -76 -41 
Spider Phobic (version c)         
CUN, PCC, MOG, LING, FFG, IOG, 
IPL, SPL, MTG, PCL, PoCG, PreCG, 
MFG, MeFG, ACC, INS, CB   4837 7.81  18 -97 -2 
FFG, MTG   86 4.55  45 -13 -26 
PCU, PCL   29 3.53  6 -43 55 
PreCG, MFG, IFG   54 3.80  51 2 43 
MFG, SFG   149 4.88  36 47 37 
MFG, SFG   56 4.65  -39 41 34 
SFG, MeFG   39 3.72  9 17 64 
IFG, INS, THA, LN, CN, CL, 
AMYG, HIP, PHG, HTH, MB, Pons, 
STG, MTG, PreCG   2518 5.31  -36 14 -8 
Control (version d)         
LING, CUN   35 4.74  -15 -91 -8 
         
Bird Cue > Spider Cue         
Control (version d)         
IFG, MFG   109 4.35  42 29 13 
           
 
Note. n = 20 spider phobics and 19 controls. k = cluster size in number of voxels; peak MNI 
coordinates = Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates referring to the maximally 
activated voxel in each cluster; ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; AMYG = amygdala; CB = 
cerebellum; CL = claustrum; CN = caudate nucleus; CUN = cuneus; FFG = fusiform gyrus; 
7 
 
HIP = hippocampus; HTH = hypothalamus; IFG = inferior frontal gyrus;  INS = insula; IOG 
= inferior occipital gyrus; IPL = inferior parietal lobule; ITG = inferior temporal gyrus; LING 
= lingual gyrus; LN = lentiform nucleus; MB = midbrain; MeFG = medial frontal gyrus; MFG 
= middle frontal gyrus; MOG = middle occipital gyrus; MTG = middle temporal gyrus; PCC 
= posterior cingulate cortex; PCL = paracentral lobule; PCU = precuneus; PHG = 
parahippocampal gyrus; PoCG = postcentral gyrus; PreCG = precentral gyrus; SFG = superior 
frontal gyrus; SOG = superior occipital gyrus; SPL = superior parietal lobule; STG = superior 
temporal gyrus; THA = thalamus. Versions a-d refer to the contrast versions performed (see 
text for details). 
puncorr < .001; k ≥ 26. 
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B. Neural responses on presentation of different targets (manipulation check, Step 2)   
Analyses were similar to Step 1 but for spider versus bird targets in the detection phase (i.e., 
the visual search task). The analysis of both groups combined yielded, first, greater activity 
for spider than for bird targets within the cingulate cortices (anterior and posterior), the 
superior frontal gyrus, and parts of the left inferior parietal lobule (Figure S5).  
 
Figure S5. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing spider compared with bird targets in the detection 
phase; version a: spider phobics (n = 20) and controls (n = 19) combined.       
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; spider target > bird target. See Table S2 for definitions of abbreviations. 
 
Bird targets rather than spider targets, in contrast, provoked greater activity within the 
inferior frontal gyrus, various occipital areas, and bilaterally in the superior parietal lobule 
(extending into the inferior parietal lobule; Figure S6). 
 
Figure S6. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing bird compared with spider targets in the detection 
phase; version a: spider phobics (n = 20) and controls (n = 19) combined.       
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; bird target > spider target. See Table S2 for definitions of abbreviations. 
 
 When both groups of participants were contrasted with each other (version b; Figure 
S7; see Table S2 for details), greater activity for spider than for bird targets in spider phobics 
versus controls was observed in many areas overlapping with those also differentially 
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activated during spider expectancy, as described above (cf. Step 1), thus confirming clear 
group differences regarding the responses to the two targets. 
Figure S7. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing spider compared with bird targets in the detection 
phase; version b: spider phobics (n = 20) > controls (n = 19).        
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; spider target > bird target. See Table S2 for definitions of abbreviations. 
 
In spider phobics (version c), areas that were particularly activated during detection of 
spiders (compared with birds) included, among others, the cingulate cortex (ACC and PCC), 
the insula, and the lateral prefrontal cortex in the superior and inferior frontal gyri (Figure S8; 
see Table S2 for completeness).  
 
Figure S8. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing spider compared with bird targets in the detection 
phase; version c: spider phobics (n = 20).       
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; spider target > bird target. See Table S2 for definitions of abbreviations. 
 
In addition, spider phobics showed lower activity for spider targets than bird targets in 
two ventral areas within the visual cortex (Figure S9). 
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Figure S9. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing bird compared with spider targets in the detection 
phase; version c: spider phobics (n = 20).       
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; bird target > spider target. See Table S2 for definitions of abbreviations. 
 
The control group (version d) did not display significantly greater activity for spider 
than for bird targets in any brain area. By contrast, these participants were characterized by 
increased activity for bird rather than spider targets within the inferior frontal gyrus, insula, 
middle frontal gyrus, inferior parietal cortex, and various occipital areas (Figure S10). 
 
Figure S10. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing bird compared with spider targets in the 
detection phase; controls (n = 19).      
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; bird target > spider target. See Table S2 for definitions of abbreviations. 
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Table S2 
Areas Displaying Differential Activity for Spider Targets Versus Bird Targets: Detection 
Phase 
        
Peak 
MNI Coordinates 
Region 
    
k t 
 
x y z 
                      
           
Spider Target > Bird Target         
Both Populations (version a)         
ACC, MeFG, SFG   221 5.30  0 32 13 
SFG   54 4.45  -18 56 31 
PCC, PCU   249 5.56  -6 -49 31 
IPL, MTG, STG   156 4.66  -48 -70 34 
Spider Phobic > Control (version b)         
ACC   222 5.58  0 35 13 
IFG   28 3.94  -42 29 1 
IFG, MFG   92 4.31  39 32 4 
IFG, STG, INS, MFG   109 4.15  -36 20 -20 
MTG, STG   139 4.76  -51 -61 10 
MTG, STG   298 4.69  57 -55 13 
SFG, MFG   35 3.93  -27 47 25 
PCC, PCU   49 3.86  -12 -34 40 
PCL, PCC, PCU   128 4.27  18 -43 55 
IPL   111 4.83  66 -31 31 
IPL   99 4.26  -57 -43 28 
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CB   57 5.12  -24 -73 -41 
Spider Phobic (version c)         
ACC, MeFG, SFG, SCG   486 6.69  0 32 13 
SFG, MFG   82 4.82  -21 56 31 
SFG, MFG   36 4.26  -24 44 46 
IFG, MFG   44 4.19  48 35 -11 
IFG, STG, INS   168 4.44  -36 20 -20 
STG, IFG   35 3.92  36 11 -17 
PCC   51 4.20  -3 -13 34 
PCC, PCU   291 5.07  -6 -49 28 
IPL, STG, MTG, PoCG   266 5.51  66 -31 31 
IPL   170 4.60  -60 -40 28 
MTG, STG, IPL   182 4.65  -51 -58 10 
CB   45 4.93  -24 -76 -38 
         
Bird Target > Spider Target         
Both Populations (version a)         
IFG, INS   41 4.76  30 23 -5 
MFG, IFG   242 5.06  39 29 22 
CUN, LING, IOG, MOG, SOG, PCU, 
PCC, FFG, CB   1466 6.63  -6 -79 -5 
MOG, IOG, FFG, ITG, MTG, CB   335 6.18  45 -79 -2 
IPL, SPL, PoCG   197 4.45  42 -46 43 
SPL, IPL   83 4.10  -27 -64 40 
Spider Phobic (version c)         
CUN, LING, IOG   451 5.25  -6 -79 -5 
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IOG   26 3.90  36 -85 -8 
Control (version d)         
IFG, INS   307 4.68  27 26 -5 
IFG, MFG   67 3.90  42 8 28 
MTG, ITG, STG, MOG, IOG, SOG, 
PCU, CUN    570 6.42  48 -76 1 
PCU   54 3.75  -24 -79 28 
PCU   31 3.68  24 -58 52 
MOG, IOG, FFG, MTG, CB   380 5.67  -39 -43 -20 
FFG, CB   192 6.22  39 -46 -32 
LING, CUN, CB   379 4.20  -3 -61 -38 
           
 
Note. n = 20 spider phobics and 19 controls. k = cluster size in number of voxels; MNI 
coordinates = Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates referring to the maximally 
activated voxel(s) in each cluster. ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; CB = cerebellum; CUN = 
cuneus; FFG = fusiform gyrus; IFG = inferior frontal gyrus; INS = insula; IOG = inferior 
occipital gyrus; IPL = inferior parietal lobule; ITG = inferior temporal gyrus; LING = lingual 
gyrus; MeFG = medial frontal gyrus; MFG = middle frontal gyrus; MOG = middle occipital 
gyrus; MTG = middle temporal gyrus; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; PCL = paracentral 
lobule; PCU = precuneus; PoCG = postcentral gyrus; SCG = subcallosal gyrus; SFG = 
superior frontal gyrus; SOG = superior occipital gyrus; SPL = superior parietal lobule; STG = 
superior temporal gyrus. Versions a-d refer to the contrast versions performed (see text for 
details). 
puncorr < .001; k ≥ 26. 
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C. Differences in neural activity between unexpected and ambiguously cued targets and 
between expected and ambiguously cued targets (addition to Step 3)  
The nature of ambiguously cued trials tremendously differed from that of unambiguously 
cued trials in our study. For instance, the majority of participants mentioned after the study 
that they had not trusted ambiguous cues (see Method section for details). For the sake of 
completeness, however, we also contrasted responses to ambiguously cued spiders and birds 
with responses to unambiguously cued spiders and birds. Specifically, we performed a whole-
brain analysis in which we first contrasted responses to spider targets that were preceded by 
bird cues (i.e., unexpected spiders), relative to responses to spider targets that were preceded 
by ambiguous cues (both bird cue > ambiguous cue and ambiguous cue > bird cue; performed 
on spider targets only). Two different versions of these contrasts were calculated: (a) for both 
populations together and (b) for spider phobics versus controls (interaction contrast), 
permitting the identification of spider phobics’ particularities in initial responses toward 
incongruently versus ambiguously cued spider targets. Thus, the latter interaction contrast 
tested whether the differences revealed by the two contrasts specified above (bird cue > 
ambiguous cue and ambiguous cue > bird cue, performed on spider targets only) were 
statistically different between phobics and controls (phobics > controls; note that testing the 
opposite direction was not necessary because the cue contrasts were already tested in both 
directions). If there was a significant difference, its nature was identified by looking 
separately into phobics and controls. The same types of contrasts were performed for the 
difference between expected and unambiguously cued spider targets and also for the 
difference between unexpected and ambiguously cued bird targets, as well as for the 
difference between expected and ambiguously cued bird targets.  
To avoid alpha inflation, we report only significant clusters containing at least 26 
contiguous voxels at p < .001. This critical cluster size was calculated by a Monte Carlo 
simulation with 10,000 iterations, assuming some interdependence between voxels (8-mm 
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FWHM), resulting in a corrected whole-brain p-value of .001. All parametric maps were 
rendered on sections of the average T1-weighted template brain of all participants. 
 
C1: Comparison of neural activity for (i) unexpected and ambiguously cued spiders and (ii) 
expected and ambiguously cued spiders  
(i) When comparing neural activity for those spider targets that had been preceded by bird 
cues (i.e., unexpected spider targets) with activity for spider targets that had been preceded by 
ambiguous cues, we found increased activity in the visual cortex (Figure S11; see Table S3 
for details) for the unexpected spider targets, but only when spider phobics and controls were 
combined (version a). Phobics and controls did not differ with respect to their responses to 
unexpected compared with ambiguously cued spider targets (version b). 
 
Figure S11. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing unexpected compared with ambiguously cued 
spider targets in the detection phase; version a: spider phobics (n = 20) and controls (n = 19) combined.       
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; unexpected spider target > ambiguously cued spider target. See Table S3 for definitions 
of abbreviations. 
 
(ii) A highly similar picture emerged when we compared neural activity for those spider 
targets that had been preceded by spider cues (i.e., expected spider targets) with activity for 
spider targets that had been preceded by ambiguous cues. Specifically, we observed increased 
activity in the visual cortex (Figure S12) for the expected spider targets, again only when 
spider phobics and controls were combined (version a). Phobics and controls did not differ 
with respect to their responses to expected compared with ambiguously cued spider targets 
(version b). 
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Figure S12. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing expected compared with ambiguously cued 
spider targets in the detection phase; version a: spider phobics (n = 20) and controls (n = 19) combined.       
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; expected spider target > ambiguously cued spider target. See Table S3 for definitions of 
abbreviations. 
 
 Together, therefore, our analyses for the ambiguous spider targets revealed highly 
similar neural differences between both types of unambiguously cued spider target trials, on 
the one hand, and ambiguously cued spider target trials, on the other hand. These differences 
are located in the visual cortex, suggesting stronger visual engagement in the unambiguously 
cued trials, which possibly relates to the fact that the ambiguous cues provoked overall greater 
confusion and complicated visual search activities.  
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Table S3 
Areas Displaying Differential Activity for (i) Unexpected Versus Ambiguously Cued Spiders 
and (ii) Expected Versus Ambiguously Cued Spiders: Detection Phase 
        
Peak 
MNI Coordinates 
Region 
    
k t 
 
x y z 
                      
           
(i) Unexpected Spider Target > Ambiguously Cued Spider Target   
Both Populations (version a)         
CUN, MOG, SOG, MTG    418 4.99  15 -97 25 
         
(ii) Expected Spider Target > Ambiguously Cued Spider Target   
Both Populations (version a)         
CUN, MOG, SOG, IOG, LING, FFG, 
PCU, MTG, CB   1748 6.64  3 -91 22 
FFG, LING, MOG, IOG, PHG, CB   295 5.08  30 -79 -17 
CB, PHG, LING   63 4.31  -12 -49 -5 
           
 
Note. n = 20 spider phobics and 19 controls. k = cluster size in number of voxels; MNI 
coordinates = Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates referring to the maximally 
activated voxel(s) in each cluster; CB = cerebellum; CUN = cuneus; FFG = fusiform gyrus; 
IOG = inferior occipital gyrus; LING = lingual gyrus; MOG = middle occipital gyrus; MTG = 
middle temporal gyrus; PCU = precuneus; PHG = parahippocampal gyrus; SOG = superior 
occipital gyrus. Versions a-d refer to the contrast versions performed (see text for details). 
puncorr < .001; k ≥ 26.  
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C2: Comparison of neural activity for (i) unexpected and ambiguously cued birds and (ii) 
expected and ambiguously cued birds  
(i) When comparing neural activity in the overall sample (version a) for those bird targets that 
had been preceded by spider cues (i.e., unexpected spider targets) with activity for bird targets 
that had been preceded by ambiguous cues, we also found increased activity in the visual 
cortex (Figure S13; see Table S4 for details) for the unexpected bird targets. However, this 
time, we additionally observed massively increased activity in various frontal and parietal 
areas for the unexpected bird targets; areas that strongly overlapped with those arising in the 
contrast of unexpected versus expected birds.  
 
Figure S13. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing unexpected compared with ambiguously cued 
bird targets in the detection phase; version a: spider phobics (n = 20) and controls (n = 19) combined.       
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; unexpected bird target > ambiguously cued bird target. See Table S4 for definitions of 
abbreviations. 
 
Furthermore, phobics and controls did differ with respect to their responses to 
unexpected compared with ambiguously cued bird targets (version b). Specifically, phobics 
were characterized by a stronger distinction of unexpected and ambiguously cued bird target 
trials as revealed by neural activity within the inferior parietal lobule (Figure S14). As a 
consequence, we performed contrasts separately for spider phobics and controls.  
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Figure S14. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing unexpected compared with ambiguously cued 
bird targets in the detection phase; version b: spider phobics (n = 20) > controls (n = 19).       
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; unexpected bird target > ambiguously cued bird target. See Table S4 for definitions of 
abbreviations. 
 
Differences for the phobic group (version c; Figure 15) strongly resembled those uncovered 
for the overall sample of participants. 
 
Figure S15. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing unexpected compared with ambiguously cued 
bird targets in the detection phase; version c: spider phobics (n = 20).       
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; unexpected bird target > ambiguously cued bird target. See Table S4 for definitions of 
abbreviations. 
 
Differences for the control group (version d; Figure S16) were highly similar but appeared, on 
the whole, to be more restricted. Note, however, that the only significant group difference 
arose in the inferior parietal lobule (see version b above). 
Figure S16. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing unexpected compared with ambiguously cued 
bird targets in the detection phase; version d: controls (n = 19).       
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; unexpected bird target > ambiguously cued bird target. See Table S4 for definitions of 
abbreviations. 
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(ii) Finally, the picture that emerged, when we compared neural activity for those bird targets 
that had been preceded by bird cues (i.e., expected bird targets) with activity for bird targets 
that had been preceded by ambiguous cues, strongly resembled all other contrasts performed 
with respect to the ambiguous cues. Specifically, we observed increased activity in the visual 
cortex (Figure S17) for the expected bird targets, again only when spider phobics and controls 
were combined (version a). Phobics and controls did not differ with respect to their responses 
to expected compared with ambiguously cued bird targets (version b). 
 
Figure S17. Areas displaying greater activity on viewing expected compared with ambiguously cued bird 
targets in the detection phase; version a: spider phobics (n = 20) and controls (n = 19) combined.       
p < .001; k ≥ 26 voxels; expected bird target > ambiguously cued bird target. See Table S4 for definitions of 
abbreviations. 
 
Hence, our data suggest that, irrespective of the nature of the target, differences 
between ambiguously and unambiguously cued trials are restricted to the visual cortex, which 
might be explained by a complicated visual search following the less predictive ambiguous 
cues. Only in the case of bird targets do we see an additional implication of various frontal 
and parietal areas, which further strengthens our hypothesis that expectancy influences on 
attention to threat are more restricted.  
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Table S4 
Areas Displaying Differential Activity for (i) Unexpected Versus Ambiguously Cued Birds and 
(ii) Expected Versus Ambiguously Cued Birds: Detection Phase 
        
Peak 
MNI Coordinates 
Region 
    
k t 
 
X Y z 
                      
           
(i) Unexpected Bird Target > Ambiguously Cued Bird Target 
Both Populations (version a)         
MFG, MeFG, IFG, SFG, STG, PreCG   2346 6.01  51 32 34 
MFG, IFG, SFG   351 5.16  -45 20 40 
MFG   41 4.16  -39 53 -2 
IFG, STG   70 4.55  -21 14 -17 
INS, MTG   58 4.65  42 14 -47 
PONS, PHG   44 5.15  9 -16 -26 
CN, THA   155 4.91  9 11 10 
IPL   166 4.37  -54 -64 31 
IPL   81 4.02  45 -46 52 
CUN, LING, FFG, MOG, IOG, SOG, 
PCU, CB   2643 7.05  3 -91 19 
Spider Phobic > Control (version b)         
IPL, STG   29 3.79  66 -46 25 
Spider Phobic (version c)         
MFG, SFG   151 5.12  30 62 16 
IFG, MFG, STG   708 5.01  42 23 -17 
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IFG   35 4.01  -21 14 -17 
SFG   113 4.05  9 29 55 
STG, MTG, IPL   130 4.75  60 -58 10 
ITG, MTG   37 3.98  45 8 -47 
THA, CN   26 3.60  9 -1 13 
CUN, LING, FFG, MOG, IOG, PCU, 
CB   1982 6.30  3 -94 19 
CB   28 4.09  -45 -64 -38 
CB   32 4.00  21 -40 -50 
Control (version d)         
MFG, IFG, SFG   236 4.62  51 32 34 
MFG, IFG   171 4.40  -42 20 40 
SFG, MFG   298 4.79  9 53 34 
IPL   31 3.63  -51 -49 49 
PHG, CUN, SOG   35 4.19  24 -97 22 
CUN   63 4.03  3 -91 16 
           
(ii) Expected Bird Target > Ambiguously Cued Bird Target   
Both Populations (version a)         
MOG, CUN     181 5.07  21 -103 13 
FFG, MOG, LING, CB     109 5.38  -30 -76 -17 
LING, FFG, MOG, CB     81 4.56  18 -82 -14 
           
 
Note. n = 20 spider phobics and 19 controls. k = cluster size in number of voxels; MNI 
coordinates = Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates referring to the maximally 
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activated voxel(s) in each cluster; CB = cerebellum; CN = caudate nucleus; CUN = cuneus; 
FFG = fusiform gyrus; IFG = inferior frontal gyrus; INS = insula; IOG = inferior occipital 
gyrus; IPL = inferior parietal lobule; ITG = inferior temporal gyrus; LING = lingual gyrus; 
MeFG = medial frontal gyrus; MFG = middle frontal gyrus; MOG = middle occipital gyrus; 
MTG = middle temporal gyrus; PCU = precuneus; PHG = parahippocampal gyrus; PreCG = 
precentral gyrus; SFG = superior frontal gyrus; SOG = superior occipital gyrus; STG = 
superior temporal gyrus; THA = thalamus. Versions a-d refer to the contrast versions 
performed (see text for details). 
puncorr < .001; k ≥ 26. 
